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This paper examines the role of inventories in the decline of production, trade, and expenditures in
the US in the economic crisis of late 2008 and 2009. Empirically, we show that international trade
declined more drastically than trade-weighted production or absorption and there was a sizeable inventory
adjustment. This is most clearly evident for autos, the industry with the largest drop in trade. However,
relative to the magnitude of the US downturn, these movements in trade are quite typical. We develop
a two-country general equilibrium model with endogenous inventory holdings in response to frictions
in domestic and foreign transactions costs. With more severe frictions on international transactions,
in a downturn, the calibrated model shows a larger decline in output and an even larger decline in international
trade, relative to a more standard model without inventories. The magnitudes of production, trade,
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From August 2008 through April 2009, the US experienced a nearly 27 percent fall of
(non-petroleum real) imports and exports.1 This collapse in trade was massive, substantially
larger than the 15 percent drop in industrial production in manufacturing, as well as wide-
spread, occurring on a global level. The cause and nature of the drop in trade have become
a key question for international economists.
The answer to this question has important implications for the length of recovery,
optimal policy response, as well as for whether similar drops in trade should be expected
in future recessions or are unique to the particular nature of this crisis. If the drop in
trade is primarily a result of trade ﬁnancing drying up, a widespread hypothesis (ICC, 2008,
Economist, 2009a, Dorsey, 2009, Dougherty, 2009, Auboin, 2009, Amiti and Weinstein, 2009,
Chor and Manova, 2009), then it follows that the recovery would be as persistent as the
underlying shock, and so tightly linked to the ﬁnancial recovery and the return of trade
credit. Looking forward, collapses in trade should be unique to downturns stemming from
the ﬁnancial system. Moreover, the disproportionate drop in trade would stem from an
increase in the relative cost/price of imported goods.
This paper explores the role of inventory adjustment in response to an economic down-
turn, an explanation with strikingly diﬀerent implications. The mechanism is simple and
well-known in the closed-economy literature (see Ramey and West, 1999). Since production
is equal to sales plus inventory investment, production is more volatile than sales whenever
inventory investment is procyclical. In an open economy, if inventories are particularly im-
portant for goods traded internationally, imports and exports can be even more volatile than
both sales and production. The inventory explanation would lead to a drop in trade that is
steep but shorter-lived relative to underlying shocks. That is, if inventories play an impor-
tant role in the downturn, once the inventory adjustment is over, trade should recover quite
r a p i d l y . T h ed r o pi ni n v e n t o r i e ss h o u l dn o tb ep a r t i c u l a rt oaﬁnancial crisis but would be
robust to more general shocks causing economic downturns. Finally, the economic costs of
1Including petroleum-based goods, which experienced very large terms of trade movements along with a
substantial shock to US oil production from Hurricane Ike, over this period, exports fell 27.5 percent and
imports fell 22 percent.
1the volatility in trade would be less than those implied in a model without inventories to
smooth ﬁnal output.
I nt h ep a p e r ,w ee v a l u a t et h ei n v e n t o r yc h a n n e li nt h ed r o pi nU St r a d e ,b o t he m -
pirically and quantitatively, through the lens of an open economy model. We make three
points.
First, in documenting features of trade and inventory dynamics, we show that the
responsiveness of trade in the recent recession has not been unusual when compared to other
recessions. Thus, prima facie, it appears to be the size rather than the nature of the shock
that explains the large drop in trade. Second, both aggregate and disaggregate data show a
strong role for inventories that are quantitatively important, though again these movements
appear to be consistent with earlier episodes. Third, the cyclical features of trade are well-
accounted for in a model with inventories when trade frictions are relatively more severe than
domestic frictions.
We establish the ﬁrst point, that the trade decline is not unusual, by comparing the
aggregate dynamics of trade in the current recession with those of the six most recent (i.e.,
post-1970) past recessions. The observed decline in trade in the recent recession is not only
large when compared to economic activity but also when compared to the drop in either
the production or consumption of tradables. Speciﬁcally, the drop in trade is roughly four
times the drop in output, and 50 percent more than the drop in industrial production or
trade-weighted expenditures (i.e., real sales) of tradable goods.2 Most important, the recent
recession does not appear to be unusual. During the median recession, both exports and
imports are about 50 percent more volatile than industrial production or expenditures on
tradables.
We use multiple sources of data to establish our second point: the important role
for inventories in past recessions. The aggregate data alone indicate an important role for
inventories in the most recent recession that started in the fourth quarter of 2007 and deepened
substantially in September 2008. Focusing on just the period beginning in September 2008,
2Real sales are a proxy for expenditures for US production, and so without inventory adjustment or a
change in the relative price of foreign to domestic goods, a pure demand shock for US goods should move
one-for-one with exports. Similarly, a simple shock to demand for US consumers should move imports one-
for-one with real sales.
2when the collapse in trade accelerated, we ﬁnd that in the 12 months ending in August 2009,
total real imports declined by $238 billion compared to the annualized level in the 3 months
ending in August 2008, and exports fell $202 billion. At the same time, the stock of US
business inventories fell approximately $102 billion from the end of August 2008 to the end of
August 2009. Thus, there is a substantial adjustment of inventories that coincided with the
collapse in trade. From the end of August 2008 through end of April 2009, the inventory-to-
sales ratios rose 5 percent overall, 6 percent in (non-auto) consumer goods and 19 percent in
capital goods. Again, however, the current recession does not appear unusual; the elasticity
of the inventory-sales ratio is quite close to the median over the past seven recessions. Finally,
the quick and stark recovery in trade since the trough in 2009Q2 is consistent with a role for
inventories, given the short-run nature of inventory dynamics that we noted above. Following
the massive collapse in trade and reduction in inventory, the recovery has been strong; by
2009Q4, trade has recovered to levels consistent with the levels of production, expenditure,
and inventories.
Aggregate inventory numbers by themselves cannot establish a direct link between
inventory dynamics and international trade. To do this, we focus on the auto industry, which
is ideal for two reasons. One, it was the industry that showed the largest drop in trade, and
so it is a quantitatively important industry that played a leading role in the collapse. Second,
for the auto industry we have data on foreign and domestic sales, orders, and inventories,
which enable a direct connection.
In these data, both imports and sales of foreign automobiles began dropping in mid-
2008, and the inventory-to-sales ratios rose roughly 45 percent over six months. Over the
ﬁrst three months of 2009, sales began to recover somewhat, but imports continued to fall
precipitously, while the inventory-to-sales ratios adjusted downward by 40 percent. The fall
in auto imports began to level oﬀ only in the 2nd quarter of 2009, after this adjustment.
Again, these dynamics do not appear to be peculiar to the recent recession. We show similar
dynamics in the US auto market in the 1970s and in Japan in its last four recessions.
Our third contribution is a model-based quantitative analysis of the mechanism we
propose: an economic shock, which raises inventory-to-sales ratios above desired levels, caus-
ing a more precipitous drop in economic activity, especially international trade. We embed
3the partial equilibrium model of trade and inventory adjustment in Alessandria, Kaboski, and
Midrigan (forthcoming) (AKM, hereafter), into a two-country general equilibrium model of
international business cycles. Inventory holdings here are microfounded in that distributors
face ﬁxed transaction costs of ordering, shipping lags, and overall demand uncertainty.
We discipline the model using both aggregate and microdata on trade and inventories.
The model accounts for the relatively larger drop in imports than production because the
frictions are particularly large for importers, leading them to hold a larger stock of inventories
(relative to sales), consistent with the data.3 We calibrate the frictions to match the aggregate
inventory-to-sales ratios, as well as the evidence on the lumpiness of transactions and the
relative importance of inventories for importers vs. non-importers.
We then perform several experiments to quantify the model’s predictions for trade,
inventory, and sales dynamics. First, we consider the dynamic response of real variables
in a global recession that arises from a simultaneous increase in the cost of ﬁnancing labor
expenditures in both countries. Our model with inventories shows a substantially deeper (37
percent larger) drop in trade relative to the drop in production. Inventory-to-sales ratios
increase substantially but then decline (and actually overshoot) before stabilizing. Moreover,
the magnitudes of responses are comparable to those observed in the recent recession. Our
results are robust to introducing alternative disturbances that change the intertemporal cost
of borrowing, as well as to other reasonable perturbations of the model.
Our ﬁndings are related to several papers examining the trade collapse and crisis of
2008-09. Levchenko et al. (2009) analyze the cyclical properties of US trade and conclude
t h a tt h ed e c l i n ei nt r a d ew a si n d e e du n u s u a l l yl a r g ei na b s o l u t et e r m s . W ea g r e et h a tt h e
decline in trade was large but emphasize that relative to the large decline in production,
the decline in trade was not unusual. Indeed, as Imbs (2009) points out, what is unusual is
that the recession was both large and synchronized across countries. Levchenko et al. (2009)
also examine trade dynamics at the sectoral level and ﬁnd no relation between inventory
holdings of manufactures and the decline in trade, however. We caution against concluding
3AKM document the severity of these frictions and their relative importance for importers. Their partial
equilibrium model performs relatively well in explaining the quantitatively large and short-lived drops in
imports experienced in developing countries (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Korea, Mexico, Thailand, and Russia)
during recent ﬁnancial crises characterized by large devaluations.
4that inventories played a limited role, since imported inventories can be held at many stages
of production (e.g., manufacturers, wholesalers, or retailers), as other authors have noted
(e.g., Ramey and West, 1999). Our study of motor vehicles is a prime example, where US
retailers and wholesalers hold nearly four times the inventory of manufacturers. Empirical
work that controls for these downstream inventories would be useful to evaluate this channel.
In our previous work, AKM, we found that following a large devaluation in emerging markets,
goods with high inventory experienced greater drops in trade in the subsequent year.
Recent work also examines explanations that are diﬀerent, though perhaps comple-
mentary to the inventory mechanism. One potential explanation is that the demand for
tradables is more volatile than GDP simply because its composition diﬀers. That is, perhaps
the high volatility reﬂects the composition of tradables in general, regardless of whether they
are domestic- or foreign-sourced. Our paper sh o w st h a tc o m p o s i t i o ni si n d e e da ni m p o r t a n t
part of the story but is nonetheless an incomplete explanation. Trade-weighted expendi-
ture, our proxy for demand, is substantially more volatile than GDP, but still 50 percent
less volatile than trade itself. Our ﬁndings, which focus on the past seven recessions in the
US, are consistent with those of Eaton et al. (2009), who perform a detailed analysis of
data across countries using a multi-sector, multi-country model for the most recent recession.
They attribute the relatively large drop in trade to a second potential explanation: trade costs
increased. This is the natural alternative in the static model of Eaton et al., which lacks a
dynamic inventory mechanism, and indeed they impute how large the increase in trade costs
would need to be to explain the data.
Others have argued for particular channels that increased trade costs. As discussed
above, several authors have posited that trade costs have increased because of the importance
of ﬁnance and trade credit in international trade. In this vein, Chor and Manova (2009) study
the decline in US imports at the sector and country level; their regressions relate the fall in
trade to credit market indicators in the source country. Related, Amiti and Weinstein (2009)
use regression analyses on earlier data from the Japanese bank failures in the 1990s to show
that when banks become troubled, the exports of ﬁrms that borrow fall disproportionately.
In addition to higher ﬁnancing costs, protectionist policies have also been mentioned as a
potential source of higher trade costs (Baldwin and Evenett, 2009, Economist 2009b). We
5note that all of the trade cost explanations diﬀer from our inventory mechanism in one key
way: the decline in real trade involves a substitution story that requires an increase in the
relative price of imported goods.
Several other studies examine the propagation of the crisis across countries. Using an
international input-output structure, Bems, Johnson and Yi (2009) examine the idea in Yi
(2009) that international trade in intermediate inputs contributed to the global propagation
of the crisis, also ﬁnding that the decline in trade was relatively large compared to the decline
in ﬁnal absorption or production of traded goods. However, they also ﬁnd that very little of
the US downturn was propagated through trade to the rest of the world. Finally, at a more
macroeconomic level, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2009) and Rose and Spiegel (2009) examine
the link between the severity of the crisis across countries and pre-crisis fundamentals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section documents the cyclical
properties of trade and inventories in the US with an emphasis on the most recent crisis.
Section 3 develops the model, while Section 4 presents the calibration. In Section 5, we
report the quantitative results and Section 6 concludes.
2. Empirics
This section documents two key features of trade ﬂows. First, in downturns trade
tends to fall much more than measures of income, production, or expenditure. That is, there
is a relatively high income elasticity. The relatively high volatility of trade is well-known (see
Backus, Kehoe and Kydland, 1992, for instance) and often attributed to the traded basket
being comprised primarily of durables (see Boileau, 1999, or Engel and Wang, 2007). While
this is clearly part of the story, even when using ﬁnal expenditures on traded goods rather
than income, we still ﬁnd a relatively high elasticity of trade. By these measures, we ﬁnd
that the reduction in trade in the current recession is not unusual. Indeed, what is unusual is
the magnitude of the US recession. Second, we provide evidence that there is an important
role for inventory holdings in downturns, particularly for trade dynamics. We show that
aggregate inventory dynamics in the current recession are also not unusual. We focus further
on autos because trade in autos fell the most in the current recession, and, for autos, we
can separately measure domestic sales of imported autos and imports of autos. These data
6show substantial diﬀerences between domestic sales of imported autos and auto imports that
must be ﬁlled by inventory holdings. The auto data suggest that the high elasticity of trade
may not reﬂect substantial variation in ﬁnal purchase of imports, but rather a substantial
inventory adjustment. Finally, we discuss some evidence that inventory holdings of goods
sold overseas may exceed those of goods sold at home.
A. Trade Dynamics
We now describe the cyclical properties of trade (exports and imports) in the US. A
key feature of trade ﬂows is that they are more volatile than production or absorption of
traded goods.
Table 1 presents key summary moments for US business cycles for the years 1967Q1-
2009Q4, where the data have been HP ﬁltered with a smoothing parameter of 1600.4 We
focus on this recent period, since the inventory series is ﬁrst available in 1967. In any case,
trade is most relevant for this recent period.5
Trade is about 1.5 times more volatile than manufacturing industrial production (mea-
sured by the ratio of standard deviations). Because income (measured by GDP) is less volatile
than industrial production, trade is even more volatile relative to income, with roughly a rel-
ative volatility of 3.5 (1.49/0.43=3.47 for imports and 1.64/0.43=3.81 for exports).
Given our emphasis on inventories, an equally relevant question is whether trade is
more volatile than expenditures on traded goods. In constructing a measure of ﬁnal expen-
4Our results are robust to a variety of detrending methods and controlling for the diﬀerent composition
of production and expenditure from trade (see Appendix). Given the enormous increase in trade relative to
production, we believe it is necessary to detrend the data. An additional reason to detrend is that we can
then more easily compare trade dynamics in mild and major recessions.
To more concretely understand the necessity of detrending, suppose that trade growth can be decomposed
into a part due to the trend and a cyclical part, which is always gy times the cyclical part of income. For
simplicity assume that income has no trend, so that changes in income, ∆y, are purely cyclical. Thus, if
income grows 1 percent, trade will grow gy percent + trend. Clearly, the elasticity of trade with respect to
income is (gy ∗ ∆y + trend)/∆y = gy + trend/∆y. For a decline, the trend term will counteract the cyclical
term, but this term is less important for larger declines. Thus, the elasticity on data that isn’t detrended will
appear larger, the larger the drop in income.
5The ratio of exports plus imports to GDP ﬂuctuated between 4 and 6 percent from 1947 to 1967, but
rose from 6 to over 20 percent between 1967 and 2009. Also changes in inventory management have occurred
recently, including movement to just-in-time management principles. The increase in international trade has
likely led to the increased importance of inventories, while these practices may have reduced their quantitative
importance. In aggregate, the inventory/sales ratios have been relatively stable, rising from about 1.4 in the
late 1960s to above 1.5 in the 1980s before falling to 1.3 in the 2000s.
7ditures on traded goods, it is important to realize that the durable/nondurable composition
of trade itself diﬀers starkly from overall output and also from typically tradable goods (i.e.,
equipment, consumer durables, and consumer nondurables). When constructing our measure
of the expenditures on traded goods, Y T
t , we therefore weight expenditures on durables (in-













Here the weight α is equal to the share of equipment and durables in trade ﬂows (approx-
imately 0.70; see the Appendix for calculation details) and everything is measured relative
to a base year. Notice that while Y T
t is a measure of the absorption of traded goods, it
does not distinguish between domestic and foreign traded goods. Because this measure of
ﬁnal expenditures for traded goods is slightly less volatile than industrial production, trade
is roughly 1.75 times (1.49/0.88=1.69 for imports and 1.64/0.88=1.86 for exports) as volatile
as corresponding ﬁnal expenditures.
Using the HP-ﬁltered data, Figure 1 shows the drop in trade and our measures of
economic activity relative to trend for the most recent recession. (The analogs to Figure 1 in
the previous six recessions are available in the Appendix.) The dashed vertical line indicates
the beginning of the recession according to NBER dating, and we normalize all series using
the quarter prior to the recession. From the fourth quarter of 2007 through the second quarter
of 2009, output had fallen almost 5 percent relative to trend, while industrial production and
traded goods expenditures had fallen by about 13 percent. Still, the response in trade is
substantially larger, with exports and imports falling nearly 19 and 22 percent, respectively,
relative to trend. The magnitude of these declines in trade are thus in line with the cyclical
movements from Table 1.
Still, across recessions, the timing of imports and exports does not always line up with
output or expenditures (see the Appendix). To make the declines in trade ﬂows comparable
across the diverse recessions, Table 2 reports the elasticity of trade relative to each measure
of absorption in the quarter of the peak drop in trade (so that the peak drop in imports
8and exports may be in diﬀerent quarters). The top two panels report the import and export
elasticity. To take into account the fact that exports tend to rise after the start of a recession,
the bottom panel reports the peak to trough drop in exports. Clearly, trade falls more than
our measures of income, production, or absorption across recessions.
In terms of the elasticity of the import response, the recent recession does not appear
to be atypical. While there is variation across recessions, the most recent recession actually
yields an import elasticity of 1.70, below the median import demand elasticity of 2.38. With
regard to exports, the decline in exports relative to industrial production of 1.41 in the most
recent recession is also the median relative decline. The peak to trough drop in exports
relative to industrial production of 1.75 is only slightly larger than the median drop of 1.53.
Thus, in many respects the decline in trade does not appear to be too unusual.
While our focus is on the downturn, the cyclical properties in Table 1 suggest robust
recoveries in trade as well. To date, the current recovery in trade seems consistent with this
behavior. In the last two quarters of 2009, imports and exports rose almost 12 percentage
points, while industrial production and expenditures on traded goods rose less than 5 per-
cent. Thus, the sudden, relatively large drop in trade does not appear to be very persistent.
Moreover, the recovery in trade has occurred even though economic activity itself has not yet
fully recovered. Production, sales, inventory, and trade are all about 8 to 10 percent below
their levels (relative to trend) at the start of the recession.
B. Inventory Response
We now return to the previous ﬁgures and tables to consider the comovement of
inventory holdings and trade ﬂows. As is well known, the inventory-to-sales ratio is strongly
countercyclical (the correlation with industrial production is -0.67 in Table 1). The bottom
panel of Table 2 shows that the response of the inventory-to-sales ratio is not atypical in this
recession. Across the seven most recent recessions, the median log change in the inventory-
to-sales ratio relative to industrial production is -0.56, while that in the most recent recession
is a slightly lower -0.49. With only seven recessions, it is diﬃcult to discern a change in the
cyclical properties of inventories over the cycle.
The peak in the inventory-to-sales ratio tends to precede the peak decline in imports or
9exports, however. In Figure 1, we see that the inventory-to-sales ratio rises at the aggregate
level and peaks in the ﬁrst quarter of 2009, prior to the peak decline in imports or exports.
This pattern occurs in all the recessions we consider, except for the 1990 recession when the
peak increase in inventory and declines in trade occurred in the same quarter.
One might be concerned that the nearly 6 percent increase in the inventory-to-sales
ratio from Figure 1 is too small relative to the declines in trade to account for much of the
relatively large fall in trade. This is not the case, since business inventories, a stock, are
approximately equal to 10 months of imports, a ﬂow, at the August 2008 rate of imports.6
Indeed, using monthly data, we ﬁnd that the stock of business inventory in the US fell
approximately $100 billion from the end of August 2008 to the end of August 2009 while the
c u m u l a t i v ed r o pi ni m p o r t so fg o o d so v e rt h i sp eriod, relative to the average rate from June
to August 2008, was $238 billion and for exports the drop was $202 billion.7 Thus, potentially
the inventory adjustment may account for nearly 40 percent of the decline in imports. Of
course, inventory of both domestic and foreign inputs fell over this period suggesting perhaps
a smaller role for inventories. However, without data that separate inventory holdings of
imported goods from domestic goods as well as sales of domestic and imported goods, it is
challenging to evaluate the inventory mechanism fully. Our subsequent empirical analysis of
autos and our model-based quantitative analysis overcome this challenge.
C. Disaggregated Inventory Dynamics
Although we see large increases in inventories that appear to lead the drop in trade
and suggest that part of the drop in trade reﬂects an inventory adjustment, we cannot say
precisely whether the drop in trade reﬂects a drop in ﬁnal sales of imported goods or an
adjustment in the inventory of imported goods, since most industries do not report sales
and inventory data separately for domestic and foreign goods. To understand the connection
between inventory holdings and international trade, we focus on the auto industry. A key
6This is equivalent to saying that investment is not important for the business cycle because the capital
stock does not change much in the short-run. One must be careful in comparing the change in stocks
(inventories) against the change in a ﬂow (trade).
7Comparing the twelve months ending in August, in 2008/9, exports fell about $146 billion and imports fell
$278 billion. Constructing a measure of the drop in inventory holdings in the rest of the world is challenging,
but there is clear evidence of inventory disinvestment in other countries in this period as well.
10advantage of the auto industry is that there are direct measures of domestic sales of imported
autos and imports of autos. There are also some measures of foreign and domestic inventory
held by retailers from Ward’s Automotive. Moreover, autos are an important traded good
(accounting for 10.8 percent and 17.8 percent of US non-petroleum exports and imports,
respectively, from 1999 to 2008).
Another key reason to study the auto industry, beyond the availability of data, is that
this industry had the largest and most immediate decline in trade in this recession. From
Figure 2, which plots monthly real exports and imports by end-use category relative to their
August 08 levels, we see that imports and exports of motor vehicles and parts from December
08 had fallen twice as much as total trade ﬂows and no other end-use category had fallen
c l o s et oa sm u c h .G i v e nt h es t r e n g t ha n di m m e d i a c yo ft h ec o l l a p s ei na u t ot r a d e ,w eb e l i e v e
that any explanation of the trade collapse must be able to explain autos to have a chance of
explain the aggregates more generally.
Figure 3 plots monthly US sales, imports, inventory (measured in units), and the
inventory-to-sales ratio of autos produced outside North America in the current recession
through February 2010. Here we plot log changes from the average level in the second
quarter of 2008. As with the aggregate trade data, imports fall substantially more than
domestic absorption of imported autos and there is a substantial inventory adjustment. At
its worst — the drop in trade in the 7 months, February to August 2009 — real imports had
dropped 77 log points, while sales had only fallen 30 log points, relative to 2008Q2. Thus,
f o ri m p o r t e dc a r s ,t h ed r o pi nt r a d eo v e rt h i s7 - m o n t hp e r i o dw a so v e r2 . 5t i m e st h ed r o pi n
sales.
This period of low trade was necessary to bring inventory levels more in line with sales.
Leading up to the collapse in auto imports, the inventory of foreign autos had risen about 12
percent even as sales had fallen over 33 percent; hence, the inventory-to-sales ratio increased
substantially, roughly 45 log points at its peak. The massive collapse in auto imports starting
in January 2009 was necessary to bring inventory holdings in line with lower sales levels. The
slight rebound in sales of imported autos starting in December 2008, just prior to the collapse
in imports, is consistent with the presence of excess inventories: importers reduced inventory
by both increasing sales and reducing imports. By September 2009, inventory levels had
11fallen more in line with sales, and thus, imports and sales are quite similar from September
2009 to January 2010.
In sum, the automobile data provide very strong evidence for a high elasticity of
imports relative to absorption, since these data are unlikely to suﬀer from a compositional
mismatch between our measure of imports and absorption.8 They also point to an important
role for inventory considerations in trade dynamics.
These inventory dynamics in the auto industry are not peculiar to the recent recession
but have also occurred in other periods with large trade swings. Figure 4 plots the dynamics
of imports, sales, and inventory holdings9 of foreign autos in the US using quarterly data
from 1972 to 1977 and provides clear evidence of a gap between imports and ﬁnal sales of
imported goods that is ﬁlled by inventory holdings. In particular, this period was marked by
a collapse of imports of nearly 40 log points in two quarters (from third quarter of 1974 to
the ﬁrst quarter of 1975) that followed a substantial inventory accumulation of 35 log points
(from the ﬁrst to the third quarter of 1974). It also was marked by a robust rebound in
imports and inventory holdings that preceded a boom in ﬁnal sales of imported autos.
While autos provide a clean guide to the connection between inventory and trade ﬂows,
a similar connection may hold for consumer and capital goods. Figures 5 and 6 plot the
dynamics of imports, ﬁnal expenditures (trade weighted), and inventory levels for consumer
and capital goods in the current recession. As we saw with autos, and the aggregates, within
these narrow categories imports have fallen more than ﬁnal expenditures (29 percent vs. 18
percent for capital goods at the trough in April 2009, and 13 vs. 5 percent for consumer
goods through April 2009) and have been associated with an increase in inventory-to-sales
ratios (peaking up 19 percent for capital goods and up 6 percent for consumer goods).
Finally, inventory and trade dynamics are not particular to the US but are also evident
8These import and sales dynamics are similar across the three major non-North American source countries
of U.S. automobiles, Germany, Japan, and Korea.
9We do not have data on inventory holdings of foreign autos in this period, but instead construct them
using the law of motion for inventory
INV M
t = INV M
t−1 + Mt − SM
t ,
where INV M
t denotes real inventory holdings of imported goods at the end of period t, Mt denotes real imports
of motor vehicles in t, and SM
t denotes real ﬁnal sales of autos imported from outside North America.
12in the aggregate in Japan. Figure 7 plots the manufacturing inventory-to-sales ratio, indus-
trial production, and import and export dynamics in the four downturns in Japan since 1990:
the 2007 to 2009 downturn, the 2001 recession, the East Asian Crisis (1997 to 1999), and
the 1991 downturn. For each period, we plot time zero as the peak in industrial production.
Much as for the US, these four downturns are associated with substantial increases in inven-
tory levels relative to sales and substantial declines in trade ﬂows and production. Unlike in
the US, the declines in trade ﬂows tend to be steeper for exports than imports (in 3 of the
4 periods) and exports tend to fall more than production while imports fall less. While not
our main focus, these steeper declines in exports may reﬂect greater downstream inventory
of Japanese goods (such as autos destined for the US market) or may reﬂect a higher weight
on durables in exports than imports.
D. Asymmetries in Transaction Costs and Inventory
The auto industry provides clear evidence that inventory considerations contributed
to the relatively large decline in imports relative to sales of imported autos. Indeed, from
the closed economy literature, it is well known that inventory considerations can generate
production that is more volatile than sales (Ramey and West, 1999, and Khan and Thomas
2007a,b). However, for inventories to explain the observed disproportionate fall in imports
(relative to domestic production), inventory considerations for foreign goods must not only
be present, but they must be stronger than those for domestically sourced goods. Here
we discuss some evidence that this is indeed so: the inventories of traded goods exceed
those of domestically produced goods destined for domestic sale. The discussion focuses
on evidence from three sources: the US auto industry, US industries more generally, and
ﬁrm-level evidence from our previous work on the topic (AKM 2009)
We ﬁrst clarify how inventories should be measured in light of the theory we develop
below. In our stylized model, only retailers hold inventories, and retailers of imported goods
will endogenously have higher inventory-to-sales ratios. Nevertheless, in the data, wholesalers
and manufacturers also hold inventories (of intermediate and ﬁnal goods), and the mechanism
we present is indiﬀerent to the stage in the distribution chain at which inventories are held.
For our purposes, a good should be included in foreign inventory from the time it is shipped
13out of the factory gate10 to the foreign market.11 From a measurement standpoint, these
inventories could be held by the manufacturer, in which case it would mean that ﬁrms that
export should hold more inventory, or they could be held by the wholesaler/retailer, in which
case it would mean that ﬁr m st h a ti m p o r ts h o u l dh o l dm o r ei n v e n t o r y .
To operationalize a comparison of imported and domestically sourced inventories, we
start with Ward’s data on inventories at the retail level. However, the issues above are
particularly relevant for autos, since distribution channels are quite diﬀerent for foreign and
domestic cars. While domestic autos are shipped directly to retailers, imported autos are
primarily shipped to wholesalers and then on to retailers.12 Indeed, there is also evidence that
imported inventory at wholesalers reached record highs during the crisis, leading importers
to ﬁnd extra storage space at the docks, on rail cars, and even boats.13,14 We use BEA data
on inventories at the wholesaler and manufacturer level to construct total inventory-to-sales
ratios for imported (f IS
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Wholesale Inventory + Retail Inventory of Imported Autos




Manufacturers’ Inventory + Retail Inventory of Domestic Autos
Retail Sales of Domestic Autos
A caveat with the formulas above is that they are based on an implicit assumption that
all manufacturers’ inventories are for the domestic market and all wholesalers’ inventories
10Indeed, it could actually be sooner than this. For instance, consider a car manufactured in Japan that
is produced exclusively and irreversibly for the US market. The inventory of these cars in the factory should
also be included in our measures of foreign inventory.
11Consider a transaction between a plant in China and a customer in the US that takes 12 weeks from
factory door to factory door. If the shipment is purchased at the Chinese factory, it will immediately enter
into the US plant’s inventory. On the other hand, if the shipment is sold on delivery, then it will remain in the
Chinese plant’s inventory for the 12-week voyage. Thus, the delays in shipping by themselves could aﬀect the
inventory holdings of both an importer and an exporter. Similarly, if the exporter is trying to economize on
international transactions costs, it has an incentive to build up a stock of inventory before shipping overseas.
12Dunn and Vine (2006) study seperately the inventory levels of dealers of imported and domestic autos.
They ﬁnd that once you control for the diﬀerent nature of dealer networks and composition of sales that the
inventory-sales ratios are about the same domestic and imported autos.
13A number of articles point to the problems that importers of cars faced in storing the cars that had been
shipped. In one case, Toyota rented a ship in the port of Malmo, Sweden to store 2,500 unsold autos when
its logistic center reached its limit of 12,000 autos (Wright, 2009).
14More evidence of the importance of wholesale inventories of imported autos is that from the retail in-
ventory data the imputed drop in imported cars at the peak is larger than the actual decline in imports,
implying a rise in wholesale inventories consistent with the above behavior.
14are imported cars. The relative direction of these biases is unclear. While we cannot de-
ﬁnitively quantify the diﬀerent inventory holdings without more micro data, these imperfect
adjustments measures are preferred to the Ward’s retail data, which miss out entirely on
wholesalers’ and manufacturers’ inventory.
F i g u r e8p l o t st h et i m es e r i e so fb o t ht h er a wW a r d ’ sr e t a i ld a t af o ri m p o r t sa n d
domestic autos (denoted “Wards”), our adjusted measures (denoted “BEA/Wards”), and a
measure for the US auto industry overall (denoted “US Autos (BEA)”). Comparing the
adjusted and unadjusted measures clearly shows that a focus on the retail measures (Wards)
alone substantially understates the stock of autos overall. The retail and overall measures
also tell starkly diﬀerent stories in terms of relative inventories. The retail data suggest that
importers hold less inventory than sellers of domestic autos, and our adjusted series suggest
that the inventory of imported cars is about 1.5 months larger than that of domestic cars.
Beyond the auto industry, there is other evidence that inventories are more important
for imported and exported goods more generally. The data we use are 3-digit SIC manufac-
turing level from the period 1989 to 2001. We estimate the relationship between inventory
holdings, exports, and imported inputs as
IMit = c + α0EXSit + α1MMit + εit,
where our variables are deﬁned as
IMit = inventory(eop)it/material costsit
EXSit = exportsit/(importsit +s a l e s it)
MMit = importsit/(importsit + material costsit)
Because we lack data on direct exports or imports of inputs, we adjust our measures of the
export share and import content to ensure these shares are less than one. To compensate
for re-exports in some industries, our proxy of the amount being exported, EXSit, is equal
to the amount of goods in industry i available to export in period t. Likewise, since in some
industries domestic production is small relative to imports, for our measure of the import
content of inputs, MMit, we measure this as share of material costs plus imports. In total,
15these adjustments lower the median import and export shares by a few percentage points.
The ﬁrst column of Table 3 shows that US industries more involved with trade (both
on the export and import side) tend to hold more inventory. Interpreting these results, we
note that an industry that imports 100 percent of inputs and exports 100 percent of output
would hold almost 3 times the inventory of an industry that used only domestic inputs and
sold only domestically.
One might be concerned that our ﬁndings for the US industries do not reﬂect micro
level behavior but instead reﬂect some sort of aggregation bias of heterogeneous producers.
Perhaps big plants hold more inventory than small plants and are also more likely to import
and export.
Unfortunately, we do not have plant-level data for the US. However, in AKM, we ex-
amined plant-level data in Chile and found that plants involved in trade hold more inventory,
even after controlling for industry. Here we use these data to examine whether the aggrega-
tion bias drives the results in our plant-level data from Chile. In the second column of Table
3, we present the results of a similar industry-level regression using a panel of Chilean plants
aggregated to the 3-digit industry level from 1990 to 2001. Here we see a smaller coeﬃcient
on imports and a negative coeﬃc i e n to ne x p o r t s .F i n a l l y ,i nt h et h i r dc o l u m nw er e p r o d u c e
our regression results on the individual plant-level data. For Chile, we see that the coeﬃcients
at the plant level are substantially larger than at the industry level, suggesting that if the
aggregation bias in Chile is similar to the US, then our US industry measures may understate
how trade aﬀects inventory holdings.
One might be concerned that our estimates of the inventory premia on trade are larger
for US industries than Chilean industries. Obviously without plant-level data it is not possible
to fully understand these diﬀerences, but one possible explanation is that relative to Chile,
the US is a fairly closed economy that is actually quite distant from its trading partners and
so international transaction costs are relatively larger for the US than for Chile.
Finally, we make one more note on plant-level evidence within the US. In AKM, we
examined data from a single US ﬁrm that sources both domestically and internationally. We
found that all else equal, international orders are bigger and less frequent than domestic
orders.
16Our evidence here suggests that ﬁrms use higher inventory holdings to economize on
international transactions cost. In our quantitative section, we explore the impact of these
frictions for the dynamics of trade, production, and sales.
3. Model
Before describing our full model, we consider a simple stylized example that illustrates
why goods with high inventory holdings experience relatively larger drops in imports or
production in response to a drop in sales.
Suppose that an importer has a desired inventory-to-sales ratio equal to 3. That is, it
orders goods so as to ensure that it has three periods worth of sales at the end of each period.
Imagine that its sales are equal to 10 units initially, so the ﬁrm has 30 units of inventories
and imports 10 units. Consider next the eﬀect of a 1-unit drop in this ﬁrm’s sales. Since
the ﬁrm desires a stock of 27 (9*3) units now, its imports drop by 4 units, 1 unit due to
a drop in sales, and 3 units due to a drop in its stock of inventories. Clearly, the larger
the ﬁrm’s inventory-to-sales ratio, the larger is the decline in orders necessary to restore the
desired inventory-to-sales ratio: a ﬁrm with an inventory-to-sales ratio equal to 1 would only
experience a drop in imports equal to 2 units. The table below summarizes this discussion
t Sales Inventories (eop) Imports Inventory-to-Sales
11 0 3 0 1 0 3
29 2 7 6 3
39 2 7 9 3
We now develop a model of optimal inventory adjustment and international trade to
examine the quantitative relevance of inventory decisions for trade dynamics. We extend
the partial equilibrium sS model of international trade and inventories in AKM to a two-
country general equilibrium environment. The model extends Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland
(1994) to include a monopolistic retail sector that holds inventories of both domestic and
imported intermediates. Speciﬁcally, in each country, a continuum of local retailers buy
imported and domestic goods from a competitive intermediate goods sector in each country,
and each retailer acts as a monopolist supplier in selling its particular variety of the good to
consumers. Consumers purchase these varieties and then use an aggregation technology to
17transform home and foreign varieties into ﬁnal consumption. Retail ﬁrms are subject to two
frictions that lead them to hold inventories: (i) ﬁxed costs of ordering goods from intermediate
producers; and (ii) a lag between orders and deliveries of goods. These frictions are more
severe for retailers that sell imported goods, thus leading them to hold higher inventories.
We also abstract from capital accumulation (see Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan, 2009).
A. Environment
Formally, consider an economy consisting of two countries, Home and Foreign. In each
period of time t, the economy experiences one of ﬁnitely many states ηt. Let ηt =( η0,...,ηt)
be the history of events up to date t, with the initial state η0 given. Denote the probability
of any particular history ηt as π(ηt).
The commodities in the economy are labor, a continuum of intermediate goods (in-
dexed by j ∈ [0,1]) produced in Home, and a continuum of intermediate goods produced in
Foreign. These intermediate goods are purchased and sold as retail goods to consumers. Fi-
nally, consumers combine intermediate goods to form ﬁnal goods (consumption and capital),
which are country-speciﬁc because of a bias for domestic intermediates. We denote goods
produced in the Home with a subscript H and goods produced in Foreign with a subscript
F. (Allocations and prices for the foreign country are denoted with an asterisk.) In addition,
there are a full set of Arrow securities.
Consumers






















Using Home consumers as an example, ﬁnal consumption is produced by aggregating
purchases of a continuum of domestic retail goods cH(j,ηt) and a continuum of imported





































18Here the weights vH (j,ηt) and vF (j,ηt) are subject to idiosyncratic shocks that are iid across
j and t. The parameter τ ∈ [0,1] captures the lower weight on Foreign goods (i.e., a Home
bias). The Foreign consumer uses an analogous technology except that the lower weight τ
multiplies the Home goods. The idiosyncratic shocks to preferences are not necessary but
provide a simple way to generate heterogeneity across retailers that help to smooth out the
eﬀect of the non-convexities in the retailers’ ordering decision. 15
The household purchases domestic and imported retail goods at prices pH (j,ηt) and
pF (j,ηt), respectively, supplies labor at a wage ˜ W (ηt), and earns proﬁts Π(ηt) (from retail-
ers).
In addition, it trades Arrow securities B (ηt+1) that are purchased at time t and pay
oﬀ o n eu n i tn e x tp e r i o di ns t a t eηt+1. We denote the price of the security in state ηt at time











































The budget constraint for the Foreign consumer is analogous except that prices and
proﬁts are those in the Foreign country. The prices of Arrow securities Q(ηt+1|ηt) are the
same in both countries, since they can be traded internationally at no cost.
The consumer takes prices and proﬁts as given and maximizes (1) by choosing a series
labor supply, retail purchases, investment, and Arrow securities subject to (2) and (3).
The maximization can be solved step-wise, with the consumer choosing an allocation
of retail purchases cH(j,ηt) and cF(j,ηt) to minimize the expenditure necessary to deliver
C (ηt) units of aggregate consumption. The cost-minimizing ﬁrst-order conditions deﬁne the
15Alternatively, we could have followed Alessandria and Choi (2007) and modelled ﬁrm productivity as
being stochastic, or Khan and Thomas (2007a,b) in modelling inventory order costs as being stochastic.
16We also need to set a borrowing limit in order to rule out Ponzi schemes, B(ηt) >B , but this borrowing
limit can be set arbitrarily large, i.e., B << 0.





































w h e r ew eh a v ed e ﬁned the following aggregate price indexes for Home-produced output,





















































For each country, we model a single representative producer that supplies to both
the Home and Foreign markets. Intermediate goods in the Home country are produced by









where M (ηt) is output of intermediates, and l(ηt) is labor hired. We assume an analogous
production function for Foreign-produced intermediates.
We assume that producers must pay their workers a wage ˜ W (ηt) at the beginning of
periodt, while revenues are received at the end of the period. Producers must therefore borrow
from ﬁnancial intermediaries at an interest rate r(ηt) in order to ﬁnance labor expenditure.
Their unit cost of labor is therefore equal to W (ηt)= ˜ W (ηt)(1+r(ηt)). Since our focus is
on studying the dynamics of inventories, we do not explicitly model the ﬁnancial sector or
t h es o u r c eo faﬁnancial crisis. Rather, we assume r(ηt) is exogenous and study the response
of our economy to an exogenous increase in r(ηt). Jermann and Quadrini (2009) explicitly
model ﬁnancial frictions and show how a tightening of borrowing constraints acts, in the
20model, equivalent to an increase in the tax on labor paid by consumers.
We assume perfect competition in the market for intermediate goods. Producers choose
labor in order to maximize their proﬁts, given the intermediate price ω(ηt) and wage W(ηt).
Free entry ensures that the intermediate price equals the minimum unit cost of production










In Home there is a unit mass of retailers selling goods that were produced in Home,
and another unit mass of retailers selling goods that were produced in Foreign. Retailers
purchase intermediates from producers and sell them to consumers. For a Home retailer
of good j produced in Home, retail sales are again denoted cH (j,ηt), while purchases from
intermediate goods producers are denoted zH (j,ηt). We focus on Home retailers operating
in Home, retailers operating in Foreign face an identical problem, as do Foreign retailers
operating in Home. (The subscript F continues to distinguish goods produced in Foreign,
while an asterisk continues to denote the corresponding arguments for the retailers in the
Foreign market.)
Retailers enter the period with a stock of inventories sH(j,ηt). They face the following
constraints on their ability to order new goods:
1. Purchases must be non-negative, zH (j,ηt) ≥ 0,
2. Any positive purchase (zH (j,ηt) ≥ 0) requires a ﬁxed amount φ
d of local labor.
3. With probability μd, purchases made at date t arrive in t +1(otherwise they arrive
immediately), and
4. Retailers can only sell goods on hand: cH (j,ηt) 6 sH(j,ηt)+zH (j,ηt) if the order
arrives immediately (with probability μd),o rcH (j,ηt) 6 sH(j,ηt) otherwise.
The assumption of random arrivals is intended to capture some of the uncertainty in
the lags between orders and delivery that retailers face, but more important, it allows us to
ﬂexibly vary the average length of these lags by changing μd. The lag structure is meant
21to capture the time between production of goods by producers and arrival of deliveries to
retailers. We deﬁne ξt to be the random variable that takes a value of 1 if orders arrive




, since the realization of





are independent of the current ξt, while the price that retailers charge pH (j,ηt)
can depend on the current ξt. Retailers choose these prices given consumer demand in
equation (4). They take the intermediate price ω(ηt) and wage W(ηt) as given. The problem


































































































Proﬁts are valued at Q(ηt), the Arrow-Debreu price in period 0 of a security paying one
unit in state ηt. Also, note that both beginning-of-period inventories and orders depreciate
at a rate δs.
Retailers of imported materials (e.g., Home retailers of Foreign-produced goods) face
the analogous constraints, except that the ﬁxed cost and probability of receiving orders are
speciﬁc for importing, φ
imp and μimp, respectively. The constraints on Foreign retailers are
completely symmetric.
B. Equilibrium
In this economy, an equilibrium is deﬁned as (i) an allocation of aggregate quantities
{C (ηt),L(ηt),M(ηt),B(ηt),Π(ηt)}
∞












for both Home and Foreign,










Home and Foreign, and (iii) Arrow security prices {Q(ηt+1|ηt)}
∞
t=0 , such that:
• Given prices, the allocations satisfy the consumers’ problems, the intermediate produc-
ers’ problems, and retailers’ problems in Home and Foreign; and
• The retail goods, labor, and capital markets clear in each country, and the intermediate
goods markets and Arrow security markets clear for the world economy.
We brieﬂy describe the market clearing conditions. First, Arrow securities are in zero
net supply, so the bond market clearing condition is B (ηt)+B∗ (ηt)=0 .S e c o n d , l a b o r
demand includes both labor used in the production of intermediates as well as that used by







d × 1zH(j,˜ ηt,ξt−1)>0 + φ


















































Notice that intermediate goods produced in Home, M (ηt), have two uses: they go to do-
mestic retailers of Home goods, zH (j), and to exporters of Home goods, z∗
H (j). Similarly,
intermediate goods produced in Foreign are either sold to domestic retailers of Foreign goods,
z∗
F (j) or are imported into Home, zF (j).







































We now describe the functional forms and parameter values considered for our bench-
mark economy. The parameter values used in the simulation exercises are reported in Table
4. The instantaneous utility function is given as U(C,1 − L)=l o g( C)+ψ log(1 − L).O u r
calibration involves several parameters that are relatively standard in the international real
business cycle literature, and so we assign typical values. These parameters include the pref-
erence parameters {ψ,γ,τ,β} and technology parameters {δs,α}.W ec h o o s eψ,t h er e l a t i v e
weight on leisure in the utility function in order to match a labor supply of 1/3. We assign
the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods γ =1 .5, a standard value.
Our focus in this paper is on production of storable goods, and the dynamics of output,
inventories, and sales for this sector. We thus choose parameters so as to match facts about
the relative share of imports and the inventory-to-sales ratio for goods, excluding the service
sector. Accordingly, we choose the Home bias parameter, τ equal to 0.31 in order to match a
share of imports (equivalently exports since the two countries are symmetric) in GDP of 23
percent.17 This trade share is higher than typical for the entire US, since services are mostly
not traded.
In order to facilitate comparison with available data, we model a period to be a
quarter. We therefore assign a discount factor of β =0 .99. We assign the depreciation rate
on inventories using various estimates of annual non-interest inventory carrying costs range.18
These range from 19 to 43 percent of a ﬁrm’s inventories, which implies quarterly carrying
costs ranging from 4.5 to 11 percent.19 Our assigned value of δs =0 .075 is in the mid-range
of these estimates.





, that are particular to
our inventory/retailing set-up. We start by assigning θ =3 , a typical estimate in industrial
organization studies. The standard deviation of demand shocks σv is set at 0.8.20
17This parameter must be jointly chosen with the inventory and retailing parameters, since these parameters
aﬀect the relative retail costs (and prices) of imported and domestic goods.
18These include taxes, warehousing, physical handling, obsolescence, pilfering, insurance, and clerical
controls.
19See, e.g., Richardson (1995).
20The shocks generate heterogeneity across ﬁrms, which helps to smooth out the aggregate response in a
model with non-convexities. With the lag structure, they also generate a precautionary motive for inventories.
24What is key for our study of the dynamics of trade is the diﬀerent characteristics
of imported and domestic inputs, particularly the lags and ﬁxed costs. Given our focus on
these diﬀerences, we let μimp =1 , so that imported goods arrive with a one-quarter lag. It
is common to have a such a lag on inventories in the closed economy inventory literature
(see Christiano, 1988). We then calibrate the delay on domestic goods μd, the ﬁxed cost of
ordering domestic intermediates φ
d,a n dt h eﬁxed cost of ordering imports φ
imp so that the
steady state in the model jointly matches three key moments in the data. Table 4 (column
labeled “Benchmark) reports the parameter values we use and Table 5 reports the targets
used to pin down the value of these parameters.
The ﬁrst target is the aggregate inventory to (quarterly) sales ratio (for all ﬁrms in the
US) of 1.3. We choose this to match the average ratio of total business (retail + wholesale +
manufacturing) inventory to quarterly ﬁnal expenditures on goods (measured as equipment
investment and consumption expenditure on goods) from 1998 to 2007. Two explanations are
in order about this target, particularly the denominator. First, because we only measure ﬁnal
expenditures on goods, our measure exceeds stocks of inventory relative to private GDP by a
factor of 2.5. Large sectors such as education, ﬁnance, health, and other services constitute
a large share of GDP but hold very little inventory. However, given our focus on movements
in trade relative to production and sales of traded goods, we abstract from these sectors
in our quantitative analysis just as we have in the empirical analysis. Second, business
inventory-to-sales ratios are often reported to be roughly 1.3 months rather 1.3 quarters as
we have targeted. This commonly cited ﬁgure includes all sales, not just ﬁnal sales, and so it
counts the same good multiple times (from parts supplier to manufacturer to wholesaler to
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25we target the ratio of inventories to ﬁnal rather than total sales. Below we conduct a sen-
sitivity check and show how our results change when we target a smaller inventory-to-sales
ratio.
The second target is that importing ﬁrms hold twice the inventory (relative to sales)
as ﬁrms that source domestically. This ratio is consistent with inventory-sales ratios for im-
porters vs. domestic ﬁrms that we observe for Chilean plants and for US manufacturing
industries. Our third target is the relative frequency of imported orders vs. domestic ship-
ments. Using shipment-level data of a single US steel wholesaler, in AKM we found that this
ﬁrm places orders for imports half as frequently as domestic orders.
As Table 4 (column labeled “Benchmark”) shows, the resulting value of μd is equal to
0.5. This implies an average delay of 1.5 months on domestic transactions and an additional
1.5 month delay on imported transactions. The six week additional delay for international
trade compares well with the evidence presented on shipping by Hummels (2001) and cus-
toms/processing times in Djankov, Evans and Pham (2006). Consequently, the base 1.5
month delay on domestic purchases is somewhat lower than the one quarter delay often as-
sumed in the inventory literature (see Christiano, 1988). The values for φ
d and φ
imp imply that
ﬁxed costs account for roughly 3.7 percent and 23.9 percent of mean revenues, respectively
(these costs are not incurred each period so their share in total revenue is much smaller).
Our calibration targets and additional implications of the model are summarized in Table 5.
Notice that domestic ﬁrms order with a frequency of 0.6 per quarter, while importers do so
with a frequency of 0.3 per quarter.
Tables 4 and 5 contain several additional columns that describe several sensitivity
checks we have performed. The column labeled “Low I/S" refers to an experiment in which
we target an aggregate inventory-to-sales ratio equal to 0.7, the ratio of the stock of inventories
to total quarterly sales in the US. This experiment downplays the role of inventories, since in
the model we continue to compute the ratio of inventories-to-ﬁnal sales. To match this lower
level of inventories, we set μimp = 0.4, as well as lower the ﬁxed cost of domestic and foreign
purchases, so as to keep the rest of our moments unchanged.
Finally, the column labeled “Low import premium” considers an economy in which
importers only hold a 50 percent higher stock of inventories (relative to sales) than domestic
26ﬁrms. We lower the importer’s inventory-to-sales ratio by reducing the ﬁxed cost of ordering
to 6.9 percent of period revenues (compared to 23.9 percent earlier). We describe these and
several additional experiments below.
A. Policy Rules
We next discuss the optimal policy rules of retailers in the stationary distribution with
no aggregate uncertainty.21 We start by noting that the retailers’ problem can be written
recursively. We therefore drop the time and state notation from variables and note that in
a steady state, the ordering decision is only a function of the current values of inventory sH
and the taste/demand shock νH, while the pricing decision is a function of (sH,νH),a n dt h e
delivery shock, ξH.
Figure 9 plots the ordering policy of retailers selling either domestic or foreign goods
for a given demand shock. Generally, the more inventory on hand, the smaller the order a
retailer places. The presence of a ﬁxed cost creates a region of inaction and an adjustment
region that depends on (s,v). An importer only orders when its inventory level is below a
threshold. All ﬁrms that start with inventories below this threshold order an amount that
does not depend on the initial inventory stock because the ﬁrm sells all of its current inventory
to its customers. Compared to an importer, a retailer selling domestically produced goods has
a higher threshold to reorder, but the amount ordered is much smaller. Moreover, because
goods may arrive in the current period, the amount ordered now is decreasing in the current
inventory level. The relatively large frictions of ordering internationally create a wider band
of inaction leading to larger inventory holdings on average and less frequent transactions.
Figure 10 plots the pricing policy as a function of inventory holdings for the same
idiosyncratic demand shock. Focusing ﬁrst on the pricing policy of an importer, there are
two regions divided by the order threshold. For inventory holdings below the order threshold,
the importer sets the price to absorb its total inventory. Above the order threshold, the ﬁrm
charges a price equal to a markup of θ
θ−1 over the marginal value of an additional inventory.
Thus in this region the price charged is falling in inventory holdings. The pricing policy of
21Given that idiosyncratic uncertainty is an order of magnitude greater than aggregate uncertainty, these
steady state decision rules approximate well those in the economy with aggregate uncertainty. Of course, our
solution method allows for these rules to be state-dependent.
27ad o m e s t i cﬁrm depends on whether or not its ordered inputs have arrived. If the products
have not arrived, the rationale for two pricing regions will be similar to that described for
the importer. On the other hand, if the products have arrived, then the ﬁrm will carry some
inventory into the next period and will charge a price equal to a markup over the marginal
value of an additional inventory. Its price will be very much like the price of a ﬁrm that has
substantial inventory and has decided not to order this period.
5. Experiments
In this section, we quantitatively evaluate the role of inventory holdings on aggregate
trade dynamics. To isolate the role of inventory holdings we compare the impulse response
dynamics for our benchmark inventory economy to an alternative economy without invento-
ries. The no inventory economy uses the identical model and parameter values, except that
we eliminate the ﬁxed cost and delivery delay frictions. That is, we assign φ
d = φ
i =0and
μd = μi =0 , so that retailers do not hold inventories in equilibrium. Comparing these models
provides an estimate of the role of inventory holdings on trade ﬂows in the crisis.
We consider several experiments designed to give insight into key aspects of the global
economic crisis for trade ﬂows. Namely, we consider a shock to the cost of labor through the
intratemporal interest on labor expenditures, and a shock to the intertemporal interest rate.
The intratemporal interest rate shock is eﬀectively a labor wedge, raising costs and reducing
labor supply/output, while the intertemporal interest rate shock increases inventory carrying
costs. Thus, both capture the key elements of the ﬁnancial crisis. These shocks do a very
good job of capturing the dynamics of trade and so we do not consider a separate shock
to ﬁnancing of international trade along the lines of that suggested by Amiti and Weinstein
(2009) or Chor and Manova (2009). Such a shock is like a worsening of the terms of trade
and would clearly raise the price of imported goods, lower sales, and lower trade. The eﬀects
of movements in the terms of trade on trade and prices in the presence of inventories was the
main focus of AKM.
A. An Increase in r(ηt)
Our ﬁrst experiment considers a persistent increase in the interest rate producers pay
to ﬁnance spending on labor, r(ηt), in both countries, designed to capture the global decline
28in economic activity.22 In particular, we assume that r =0in the steady state and then
consider the eﬀect of an increase in r to r1 =e x p ( 0 .075) − 1, which subsequently mean-
reverts:
ln(1 + rt)=ρln(1 + rt−1) for t > 2
with ρ =0 .75. Since we calibrate steady-state hours to ¯ l =1 /3, the frictionless economy
w o u l dr e s p o n dw i t ha
¡
1 − ¯ l
¢
×0.075 = 5 percent drop in consumption, production, imports
and all other real variables.
Figure 11 reports the response of these variables in our economy with inventories.
The upper-left panel shows that both production and imports decline substantially more
than in the frictionless model. Most important, imports decline much more than domestic
production. To understand the decline, note that in our model the following identity holds:
Yt = St + ∆It
where Yt is production (or imports), St is sales, and ∆It is inventory investment. A good that
is produced is either a) sold to the consumer or b) enters the retailer’s stock of inventories.
The subsequent two panels (upper-right and lower-left) present the dynamics of sales and
inventories in our model. Notice that although inventories initially decline less than sales
(since a number of ﬁrms have made orders in the period prior to the shock and these arrive
with a lag), the decline in inventories exceeds that of sales in subsequent periods. Hence,
as in the data, the inventory-to-sales ratio initially increases in response to the shock and
then declines. Disinvestment in inventories thus ampliﬁes the eﬀect of the shock, causing a
reduction in output much greater than the reduction in sales (lower-right panel).
The stock of inventories declines for two reasons in our model. First, sales drop,
thus reducing the returns to holding inventories, that is, the probability that retailers have
insuﬃcient inventories to meet demand. A second channel of intertemporal substitution is
22An earlier draft of this paper assumed the recession is driven by a TFP shock and found very similar
results, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Both types of shocks increase the cost of production and thus
act in very similar ways.
29quantitatively more important, however. Since the recession is associated with an increase
in labor costs, retailers sell out of the existing stock and postpone new orders for future
periods when the cost of labor is expected to decline. This second channel explains why the
inventory-to-sales ratio eventually declines in our model, as it does in the data for imported
a u t o si nF i g u r e3 .
Notice ﬁnally that the decline in inventories and sales is not too dissimilar for imported
and domestic goods. The reason imports decline much more than production is that the stock
of inventories (relative to sales) is twice greater for imported goods. Hence a larger decline
in inventory investment is necessary to bring the inventory-to-sales ratio to the desired level
for imported goods, as in the stylized example we presented earlier.
Table 6 summarizes this discussion by reporting the elasticity of imports to produc-
tion and sales in our model. We compute two measures of these elasticities. The ﬁrst is
the peak-to-trough drop in imports relative to the peak-to-trough drop in sales. Since our
model exhibits lots of lumpiness arising from inventory adjustment, we mostly focus on a
second measure by computing the ratio of the cumulative drop in imports (the area under
the impulse response function) to that of the cumulative drop in production and sales, re-
spectively. Obviously, there is no empirical counterpart to the cumulative drop, but it is
nonetheless a useful statistic to compare the properties of diﬀerent calibrations. Notice that
the cumulative drop in imports is 1.37 greater than the cumulative drop in production, and
1.61 greater than the cumulative drop in sales. Similarly, the peak-to-trough drop in imports
is 1.31 times greater than the drop in production and 3.5 times greater than the drop in sales.
The reason the short-run elasticity with respect to sales is so much larger is that sales decline
much more gradually initially in the model, as inventories help smooth consumption in face
of the negative shock.
We conclude that our model produces responses that are qualitatively and quanti-
tatively in line with the data. Recall from Table 1 that imports and exports are roughly
50-60 percent more volatile than industrial production, and 70-80 percent more volatile than
sales: our model thus predicts that inventories alone account for a sizable proportion of this
volatility.
30B. A Gradual Shock
In the data, the stock of inventories relative to sales has initially increased in the
immediate aftermath of the recession, before declining. (see, for e.g., the evidence in Figure 3
on autos). Our model can rationalize such dynamics for inventories if the shock to the interest
rate is gradual, rather than immediate, as in the experiments reported above. To illustrate
this point, we next assume a gradual increase in interest rates. Speciﬁcally, we assume that





− 1,r 2 =e x p( 0 .0725) − 1
ln(1 + rt)=ρln(1 + rt−1) for t > 2
We assume that all agents learn this process at date 1 and anticipate the subsequent
increase and decline in interest rates. Figure 12 reports the dynamics of our model to these
shocks.
Notice that the decline in inventories is much more gradual now than in our previ-
ous experiment and that the inventory-to-sales ratio is above its steady-state level several
periods after the shock. The reason is that retailers prefer to invest in inventories at date
1, in anticipation of future increases in the cost of production, and this initial investment
imparts additional dynamics to our model economy. As in the previous experiment, retailers
eventually decrease their stock of inventories, both to respond to the lower sales, as well as for
intertemporal substitution reasons. Once again, production declines more than it does in the
frictionless environment, and imports decline more than overall production. Table 6 shows
that the cumulative drop in trade in this experiment is 1.29 greater than that of production,
and 1.6 times greater than that of sales. Similarly, the peak-to-trough drop in imports is 1.48
greater than that of production and 4.1 times greater than the drop in sales. The gradual
shock exacerbates the short-run response but dampens the cumulative response.
C. A Shock to Intertemporal Prices
So far we have modelled the ﬁnancial shock as an increase in the eﬀective cost at which
ﬁrms are borrowing to ﬁnance their labor expenditures within a period, i.e., as a shock to
the labor wedge. We next consider the eﬀect of an additional increase in intertemporal price
31of current and future consumption, i.e., a shock to the interest rate. We model this shock as
an increase in the date - 0 price of goods from Q(ηt) to Q(ηt)(1+τq (ηt)). Notice from the








so that an increase in τ (ηt) corresponds to an increase in the interest rate at which consumers
are eﬀectively borrowing (or, alternatively, in the rate at which ﬁrms discount future proﬁts).










for t > 2
where ρ =0 .75.
Figure 13 reports the response of real variables in our model economy to this additional
shock, which we assume happens simultaneously as the shock to the intratemporal cost of
borrowing. Clearly, the dynamics in this economy are very similar to those in our benchmark
experiment, though the declines are greater. The reason output and imports drop more now
is an even greater adjustment in the stock of inventories. A greater cost of borrowing leads
retailers to postpone orders even further and contributes to the decline in real activity. Notice
in Table 6 in the column titled “Financial Shock” that the cumulative decline in imports is
even greater than that of production: trade declines 1.6 times more than production and 2.2
times more than sales. These numbers are very similar to those observed in the data.
6. Sensitivity
Here we explore the sensitivity of our model to several variations, including changing
the inventory-to-sales ratio in the economy, lowering the importer premium on inventory,
increasing the Armington elasticity of substitution, and lowering the magnitude of the shock.
Our ﬁndings of a relatively high sensitivity of trade relative to production and sales are
robust across these diﬀerent environments. These experiments are reported in Table 7, and
recall that Table 4 and Table 5 present the parameter values used and the moments we have
32targeted.
A. Smaller Shock
How does the elasticity of trade to production vary with the size of the drop in output?
Recall that in the data most recessions, independent of their size, produce similar elasticities
of trade to production. We next ask whether our model is indeed consistent with this feature
of the data by studying the response to a 3 percent increase in the intratemporal rate at
which ﬁrms are borrowing to ﬁnance their labor expenditures.
Notice in Table 7, in the column labeled “Smaller shock” that the cumulative drop
in trade is 1.28 times greater than that of production, and 1.65 times greater than that
of sales, thus is not too dissimilar from the response to a much larger shock (recall that
these elasticities are equal to 1.37 and 1.61, respectively). The diﬀerence in these numbers,
we conjecture, has to do with the irreversibility constraint on purchases playing a smaller
role with a smaller shock. Interestingly, the short-run decline in trade, as measured by the
peak-to-trough elasticity, is greater in the economy with a smaller shock (1.34 and 3.84 for
production and sales, respectively).
B. Lower Inventory-to-Sales Ratio
Turning to our low inventory experiment (recall that we calibrated this economy to
match a 0.7 inventory-to-sales ratio), we ﬁnd, not surprisingly, that the eﬀect on the trade
elasticity is reduced since inventory adjustment plays a less important role. The cumulative
drop in imports in now 28 percent greater than that of production (recall 37 percent in the
benchmark economy with a higher inventory-to-sales ratio), and 55 percent greater than that
of sales (recall 61 percent in the benchmark economy).
Interestingly, we ﬁnd that in this economy the short-run drop in imports is greater
than earlier. For example, the peak-to-trough drop in imports in 47 percent greater than
that of production (31 percent earlier). We conjecture that this happens because now only
40 percent of importers receive their order with a 1-period delay (we choose this lower number
so as to generate the lower inventory-to-sales ratio by reducing the precautionary-investment
motive), and hence importers can more readily react to a negative shock by decreasing the
size of orders in the immediate aftermath of the shock.
33C. Lower Import Premium
R e c a l lt h a tw en o wc h o o s ep a r a m e t e r ss oa st oe n s u r et h a ti m p o r t e r so n l yh o l d5 0
percent more inventories than domestic retailers, in contrast to the 100 percent premium we
have assumed earlier. With a lower importer inventory premium, we ﬁnd that the model once
again generates a smaller cumulative drop in trade and inventories (reﬂecting a slightly lower
stock of inventories to begin with) and similar drops in production and sales. Thus, relative
to the cumulative drop in production or sales, we get a smaller cumulative drop in trade: 24
percent and 45 percent, respectively).
Once again, these long-run elasticities do not tell the whole story, however. Now, the
peak to trough drop is actually larger than in our benchmark economy, with an elasticity
of imports to production of 1.71 versus 1.31. This seemingly counterintuitive result arises
because in our low importer premium model there are more ﬁrms closer to the adjustment
margin than in our benchmark economy, since now importers are ordering roughly every other
period compared to every third period in our baseline example. Thus, the extensive adjust-
ment accounts for a bigger short-run adjustment since the negative shock leads importers to
work through their inventory problems faster by delaying their order.
D. Higher Armington Elasticity
We also consider the impact of the elasticity of substitution on the dynamic properties
of the model. There is much debate about this value. The literature that studies long-run
trade ﬂows emphasizes a higher number than ours, while the literature on business cycles
emphasizes a smaller number. Here we consider a slightly larger elasticity of 2.5 and ﬁnd
quite similar short-run and long-run impacts on trade to those we reported earlier. Relative
to production, the peak drop in trade now falls to 1.26 from 1.31, while the cumulative drop
rises to 1.42 from 1.37. These small diﬀerences reﬂe c tt h ef a c tt h a tt h e r ea r en oi m p o r t a n t
direct relative price movements, since we have assumed a global shock that aﬀects the Home
and Foreign economy alike. All movements in relative prices operate indirectly through the
eﬀect that changes in inventory costs have on the diﬀerent inventory holdings of domestic
and foreign goods, but these eﬀects are fairly likely too small to change our results much.
347. Conclusion
This paper examines the role of inventory dynamics and international trade empirically
and theoretically, especially with regard to the dramatic drop (and strong rebound) in trade
of the most recent US recession. Empirically, we show that trade is more volatile than either
measures of trade-weighted production or expenditures, and that inventory dynamics play an
important role in this volatility. However, we also ﬁnd that trade dynamics in this current
recession are not unusual. As Imbs (2009) points out, what is unusual is the magnitude and
synchronization of the downturn.
The role of inventories is most clearly evident for trade in autos, a sector for which we
can separately measure retail sales of imported autos and imports. Indeed, we see that imports
of autos fell oﬀ ac l i ﬀ in December 2008 even as ﬁnal sales of autos recovered somewhat. The
gap between sales and imports can be explained in part because inventory levels had become
quite large relative to the rate of sales. Given that auto trade fell the soonest and the most
in this recession, we believe any explanation of the decline in aggregate trade must be able
to explain these dynamics.
To study these issues for the aggregate economy, we embed an sS model of inventory
adjustment and trade in a two-country general equilibrium model, where inventory holdings
diﬀer for domestic and imported products because of larger frictions to international trade.
We then use the quantitative theory to show that the relatively high elasticity of trade over
the business cycle may arise from inventory considerations.
To account for the current synchronized global decline in trade, our model requires
a global negative shock. With such a shock, the model can generate drops in production
and international trade and movements in inventory-to-sales ratios that are of comparable
m a g n i t u d et ot h o s ei nt h eU Se c o n o m y .W ea l s oe x p l o r et h er o l eo fc h a n g e si nﬁnancing costs
on trade ﬂows and ﬁnd that these amplify the drop in trade even further.
In summary, we ﬁnd that inventory concerns may play an important role in the propa-
gation of shocks across countries. It appears that the role of trade in the most recent recession
has not been exceptional. Trade has been particularly important in past recessions. What
has been exceptional is the size of the shock itself. We plan, in future research, to consider
the role of inventories in the propagation of international business cycles more generally.
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Industrial Production (IP) 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.89
Exports 1.49 0.52 0.46 0.74
Imports 1.64 0.81 0.79 0.75
Expenditures (TW) 0.90 0.87 0.92 0.87
GDP 0.43 0.90 1.00 0.87
Inventory 0.52 0.67 0.63 0.91
IS Ratio 0.64 -0.67 -0.65 0.81
Table 1: Summary Statistics on US Business Cycles
Notes: Based on quarterly data from 67:1 to 09:04. Data are HP filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
Median 1971Q1 1975Q2 1980Q3 1982Q4 1991Q1 2001Q4 2009Q2
Y 4.67 4.67 4.63 5.21 2.38 2.59 6.00 4.81
IP 1.64 1.15 1.64 2.41 1.18 1.54 1.97 1.66
Expenditures 2.38 2.43 2.38 2.80 2.36 1.54 5.61 1.70
Median 1971Q2 1975Q2 1980Q4 1982Q4 1990Q4 2002Q1 2009Q2
Y 2.54 2.54 1.51 0.22 3.52 1.80 7.04 4.10
IP 1.41 0.69 0.54 0.15 1.74 1.53 2.25 1.41
Expenditures 1.45 1.54 0.78 0.09 3.48 1.39 3.35 1.45
Median 1971Q2 1975Q2 1980Q4 1982Q4 1990Q4 2002Q1 2009Q2
Y 3.33 3.33 2.43 1.61 3.52 1.80 7.04 5.09
IP 1.53 0.90 0.86 1.05 1.74 1.53 2.25 1.75
Expenditures 1.80 2.02 1.25 0.64 3.48 1.39 3.35 1.80
IP -0.56 -0.40 -0.77 -1.15 -0.56 -0.77 -0.13 -0.49
INVENTORY-SALES Ratio
Notes: Measured from start of recession based on the NBER dates. The third panel measures the 
difference in exports between the peak and trough, where the peak is either the start of the recession if 
exports fall immediately. All data are HP filtered with a smoothing parameter or 1600, and so the drop 
is measured relative to the trend.
Table 2: Peak Drop in Trade Relative to Absorption
IMPORTS
EXPORTS
EXPORTS (peak to trough)US
Variable Industry Industry Plant
Export share (EXS) 0.197 -0.074 0.247
4.8 -2.3 2.7
Import share (MM) 0.193 0.067 0.145
11.4 3.1 11.1
Constant 0.222 0.209 0.218
31.5 23.0 48.8
Observations 1751 325 58546
R2 0.11 0.041 0.002
Table 3: Inventory and Trade by Industry (US and Chile)
Chile
Notes: US Industry data based on 3 digit SIC (1987) data from 89 to 01. Chile data based on 3 





gamma Armington elasticity of H vs. F 1.5 1.5 1.5
theta elasticity across varieties in H & F 3 3 3
beta discount factor 0.99 0.99 0.99
deltas inventory depreciation 0.075 0.075 0.075
sv std. dev. taste shocks 0.8 0.8 0.8
muf probability foreign orders arrive immediately 1 0.4 1
Calibrated Parameters
tau Home bias 0.31 0.31 0.31
muh probability domestic orders arrive immediately 0.475 0.23 0.475
phih fixed cost domestic orders (fraction mean revenue, % 3.65 0.68 3.65
phif fixed cost imports (fraction mean revenue, %) 23.88 9.89 6.86
Table 4: Parameter ValuesUsed for Calibration: 
Data Benchmark Low I/S
Low import 
premium
Aggregate Inventory-to-Sales ratio 1.3 1.3 0.7 1.18
Ratio I/S imports to I/S domestic 2 2 2 1.5
Share imports in GDP 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23
Ratio of frequency of domestic vs. imported orders 2 2 2 1.2
Other implications
I/S domestic retailers 1.06 0.57 1.06
I/S imported retailers 2.12 1.15 1.59
Frequency of orders, domestic 0.60 0.86 0.60
Frequency of orders, imports 0.30 0.43 0.52
Table 5: Moments
Data Benchmark Gradual shock Financial shock
Peak to Trough
 Imports /  Production 1.51 1.31 1.48 1.40
 Imports /  Sales 1.97 3.54 4.05 5.36
 Imports 0.13 0.13 0.18
 Sales 0.04 0.03 0.03
 Production 0.10 0.09 0.13
 Inventories 0.05 0.04 0.07
Cumulative
 Imports /  Production 1.37 1.29 1.60
 Imports /  Sales 1.61 1.60 2.18
 Imports 0.34 0.32 0.44
 Sales 0.21 0.20 0.20
 Production 0.25 0.25 0.27
 Inventories 0.37 0.27 0.52
Notes: The data column reports the average of the median elasticities of imports and exports
           "Gradual Shock" considers 2 consecutive, anticipated, equally sized increases in the labor wedge
           "Financial Shock" adds an additional wedge in the date-0 prices, raising the interest rate by an additional 1%.









 Imports /  Production 1.31 1.72 1.47 1.26 1.34
 Imports /  Sales 3.54 4.82 4.68 3.58 3.84
 Imports 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.12 0.05
 Sales 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01
 Production 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.04
 Inventories 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.02
Cumulative
 Imports /  Production 1.37 1.24 1.28 1.42 1.28
 Imports /  Sales 1.61 1.45 1.55 1.68 1.65
 Imports 0.34 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.12
 Sales 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.07
 Production 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.09
 Inventories 0.37 0.34 0.62 0.29 0.12




























































Figure 2A: US Real Imports (SA, $2005)
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Figure 2B: US Real Exports (SA, $2005)
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Figure 3: Dynamics of Imported Autos
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Figure 8: Inventory Measures by Source
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Figure 11: Benchmark ModelFigure 12: Benchmark Model Gradual Shock
Figure 13: Financial ShockAppendix 1: Data summary
Here we describe the data series used in constructing our ﬁgures and tables. We also report
some robustness to using alternate series.
Table 1 and 2
Most data are downloaded through Haver. The data series are
• Industrial Production: Mfr [SIC] (SA, 2002=100), IPMFG@USECON ;
• Real Gross Domestic Product (SAAR, Bil.Chn. 2005$), GDPH@USECON;
• Real PCE: Goods (SA, Bil.Chn. 2005.$), CTGH@USECON;
• Real PCE: Durable Goods (SAAR, Bil.Chn. 2005$), CDH@USECON;
• Real PCE: Nondurable Goods (SAAR, Bil.Chn. 2005$), CNH@USECON;
• Real Private Nonresidential Investment: Equipment & Software(SAAR,Bil.Chn. 2005$),
FNEH@USECON;
• Real Private Investment: Software (SAAR,Bil.Chn. 2005$), FNENSH@USECON;
• Real Change in Private Farm Inventories (SAAR, Bil.Chn. 2005$), VFH@USECON;
• Real Exports of Goods (SAAR, Bil.Chn. 2005$), XMH@USECON;
• Real Imports of Goods (SAAR, Bil.Chn. 2005$), MMH@USECON;
• Real Mfr & Trade Inventories: All Industries (EOP, SA, 2005$), TITH@USECON;
• Real Mfr & Trade Sales: All Industries (SA, 2005$), TSTH@USECON;
We measure ﬁnal expenditures, Y T
t = α(IEQ,t + CD,t)+(1− α)CND,t where IEQ,t = IEQS,t−
IS and IEQ =Investment in Equipment, IEQS =Investment in Equipment and Software,
IEQ =Investment in Software, CD =Consumption of Durables, CND =Consumption of Non-
durables and α is share of durables in total nonpetroleum imports and is measured as the








t /Mt =0 .70,
where MD is annual real imports of durables and Mt is annual real non-petroleum imports
(from the BEA table 4.2.6, $2005). Note, relative to all imports (including petroleum) the
durable share is approximately 0.60.
T oe v a l u a t et h er o l eo fﬁltering on our ﬁnding that the declines in trade in 2008-09 are not
unusual, in Table A1 we report the elasticity of trade under alternative ﬁltering methods.
In particular, we use the HP ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter of 10^5 and we also remove
a linear trend from each data series. These detrending methods remove very low frequency
trends from each data series and generate quite similar results. In the ﬁnal two columns,
we report the results on the raw, unﬁltered data. Here, we ﬁnd that the decline in trade in
the current recession is indeed unusual particularly for imports with respect to income (an
elasticity of 8.49 vs 3.19). Exports also seem to have fallen by more than usual. Given that
the rising importance of trade is often attributed to factors outside of growth in income or
production, say falling trade barriers, we believe the appropriate way to analyze the data is
to detrend it. Moreover, this detrending allows us to compare mild and severe recessions.
40The volatility of trade is substantially less volatile when compared to industrial production
rather than GDP. Obviously, this reﬂects in part the fact that the industry composition
of trade is more similar to industrial production than GDP. One might still be concerned
that the relatively high volatility of trade relative to industrial production may also reﬂect
compositional diﬀerences. To account for this, we construct a measure of industrial production
that more closely matches the composition of trade. In particular, we construct a measure of














The data for these series are availabel from 1972M1 to 2010M2. Based on the 2003-07 shares
of each good in non-petroleum imports we set αD_exMV =0 .55,α MV =0 .15,α ND =0 .30.
These shares overstate the importance of durables and motor vehicles in trade since they are
based on trade shares excluding petroleum for imports. Table A2 panel A shows that this
trade-weighted measure of industrial production that places a larger weight on durables and
motor vehicles is approximately 10 percent more volatile than US manufacturing production,
suggesting that only a small part of the high volatility of trade can be attributed to the
diﬀerent composition of industrial production from trade.
The data for these calculations are:
• IP: Durable Goods Mfg Ex. Motor Vehicles/Parts (SA, 2002=100), IPMDXMV@USECON;
• IP: Motor Vehicles and Parts (SA, 2002=100), IPG61T3@USECON;
• IP: Nondurable Mfr (SA, 2002=100), IPMND@USECON.
One might be still concerned that our trade-weighted measure of industrial production is not
disaggregated enough. To consider this, we examine the cyclical properties at the industry
level, focusing on motor vehicles. Due to data limits (we would like a real series of motor
vehicle trade and shipments), we consider monthly data from 1997:01 to 2010:01. Panel B
of Table A2 shows that trade is more volatile than producton and even more volatile than
shipments. Thus, it appears clear that trade is more volatile than production and domestic
shipments even once we control for industry composition. The data series considered are:
• IP: Motor Vehicles and Parts (SA, 2002=100), IPG61T3@USECON;
• Exports: Autos, Parts and Engines (SA, Mil.Chn.2005$), TMXEAVH@USECON;
• Imports: Autos, Parts, and Engines (SA, Mil.Chn.2005$), TMMEAVH@USECON;
• Real Sales: Mfg: Motor Vehicles & Parts (SA, Mil.Chn.2005$), TSMG6MH@USECON.
Table 3
All analysis is conducted at the SIC 4 digit level from 1989 to 2001.
• US industry data (http://www.nber.org/data/nbprod2005.html).
• US trade data (http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/pks4/sub_international.htm.)
• Chilean plant level data is described in AKM
Figure 2A and 2B:
41• Exports, f.a.s. (SA, Mil.Chn.2005$) TMXAH@USECON
• Exports: Non-Petroleum End-Use Commodity Category (SA, Mil.Chn.2005$) TMX-
ENPH@USECON
• Exports: Foods, Feeds and Beverages (SA, Mil.Chn.2005$) TMXEFBH@USECON
• Exports: Industrial Supplies and Materials (SA, Mil.Chn.2005$) TMXEIMH@USECON
• Exports: Capital Goods, except Automotive (SA, Mil.Chn.2005$) TMXECGH@USECON
• Exports: Autos, Parts and Engines (SA, Mil.Chn.2005$) TMXEAVH@USECON
• Exports: Nonfood Consumer Goods except Automotive (SA, Mil.Chn.2005$) TMX-
ECNH@USECON
• Imports: Non-petroleum Products (SA, Mil.Chn.2005$) TMMENPH@USINT
• Imports: Food, Feeds and Beverages (SA, Mil.Chn.2005$) TMMEFBH@USECON
• Imports: Industrial Supplies and Materials (SA, Mil.Chn.2005$) TMMEIMH@USECON
• Imports: Capital Goods except Automotives (SA, Mil.Chn.2005$) TMMECGH@USECON
• Imports: Autos, Parts, and Engines (SA, Mil.Chn.2005$) TMMEAVH@USECON
• Imports: Non-food Consumer Goods except Automotive (SA, Mil.Chn.2005$) TM-
MECNH@USECON
Figure 3.
Here we plot dynamics of imports, sales, and inventory of imported autos.
• Sales = from Ward’s automotive: US: Imported Car Sales ex Canada & Mexico (NSA,
Units) + US: Imported Light Truck Sales ex Canada & Mexico (NSA, Units). The
Sales series is seasonally adjusted using the Board of Governors Combined Seasonal,
Trading-day Factor for Imported Auto Sales.
• Imports = downloaded from the USITC based on select Harmonized codes for passenger
cars and light trucks from the Census. Measured as total imports minus imports from
Mexico and Canada. Seasonally adjusted using the X-12.
• Inventory = from Ward’s automotive: US: Imported Light Vehicle Inventory ex Canada
& Mexico (NSA, Units). Seasonally adjusted using the X-12.
• Inventory Sales Ratio = Inventory SA/Sales SA.
Figure 4 Dynamics of Imported Autos in 70s.
This ﬁgure was constructed using the following two series
• Imported Retail Auto Sales (SAAR, Mil.Units) BEA (AFS@USECON)
• Real Imports of Automotive vehicles, engines, and parts, BEA (Table 4.2.3 line 35)
Quantity Indexes, 2005=100, SA
To convert the Import series into units series, each observation was scaled by the ratio of








construct an inventory series it was assumed that in 1970:Q4 there were 2.5 months of inven-
tory of imported autos (It=1970Q4 =2 .5 ∗ St). From there on, we used the law of motion to
construct inventory as It = It−1 + MU
t −St. The nature of the series is robust to our scaling
and our assumption about the initial inventory-to-sales ratio.
Figure 5: Capital Goods: The three series in this ﬁgure are constructed as
42• Domestic Expenditure =[ Manufacturers Shipments Capital Goods (SA Mil $) + Im-
ports: Capital Goods except Automotives (SA, Mil.$) - Exports: Capital Goods, ex-
cept Automotive (SA, Mil.$)]/PPI: Capital Equipment: Mfr Industries (SA, 1982=100)
• Imports = Imports: Capital Goods except Automotives (SA, Mil.Chn.2005$)
• Inventory-to-Sales Ratio = Manufacturers’ Inventories: Capital Goods (EOP, SA, Mil.$)/
Manufacturers’ Shipments: Capital Goods (SA, Mil.$)
T h er a wd a t as e r i e sa r ed o w n l o a d e df r o mH a v e r .
• Manufacturers’ Shipments: Capital Goods (SA, Mil.$) NMSCG@USECON
• Manufacturers’ Inventories: Capital Goods (EOP, SA, Mil.$) NMICG@USECON
• PPI: Capital Equipment: Mfr Industries (SA, 1982=100) SP3210@USECON
• Imports: Capital Goods except Automotives (SA, Mil.Chn.2005$) TMMECGH@USECON
• Exports: Capital Goods, except Automotive (SA, Mil.Chn.2005$) TMXECGH@USECON
• Imports: Capital Goods except Automotives (SA, Mil.$) TMMECGAC@USECON
• Exports: Capital Goods, except Automotive (SA, Mil.$) TMXECGA@USECON
Figure 6 - Consumer Goods
• Imports: Nonfood Consumer Goods except Automotive (SA, Mil.Chn.2005$) - TM-
MECNH@USECON
• Expenditures = α∗D u r a b l eP C Ee xa u t o s+( 1 - α)∗Nondurable ex Gasoline
Durable PCE ex autos = CDBHM@USECON Real Personal Consumption Expenditures:
Durable Goods (SAAR, Bil.Chn.2005$) - real auto expenditures
• Real Auto Expenditures = [NRSI1@USECON Retail Sales: Motor Vehicle & Parts
Dealers (SA, Mil.$)/ PCUTV@USECON CPI-U: New and Used Motor Vehicles (SA,
Dec-97=100)]*Scaling factor
• Scaling Factor = Share of MV in DURABLE PCE in 2008Q2 from Quartarly NIPA
* Average Expenditure on Durable PCE in Monthly Data in 2008Q2/Average Real
Auto Expenditures in 2008Q2
• Nondurable ex Gasoline = Nundurable PCE - Real Gasoline Expenditures
• Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Nondurable Goods (SAAR, Bil.Chn.2005$)
CNBHM@USECON
• Real Gasoline Expenditures = (1/Scaling Factor Gasoline)*NRSI7@USECON Retail
Sales: Gasoline Stations (SA, Mil.$)/ CPI-U: Motor Fuel (SA, 1982-84=100) PCUTPM
@USECON
• Scaling Factor Gasoline = Real PCE: Gasoline, Fuel Oil & Other Energy Goods (SAAR,
Bil.Chn.2005$) CNEH@USECON in 2008Q2/2008Q2 Real Gasoline Expenditures
Retail Inventory measured as retail and wholesale industries for related industries (EOP,SA,
Mil.$):
• Retail Inventories: Furniture/Home Furnish/Electron/Appl Stores NRII2T3@USECON
• Retail Inventories: Building Mat., Garden Equip & Supply Stores NRII4@USECON
43• Retail Inventories: Clothing & Accessory Stores NRII8@USECON
• Retail Inventories: Gen Merchandise Stores NRIJ2@USECON
• Merchant Whole: Inventories: Furniture NWIH12@USECON
• Merchant Whole: Inventories: Lumber NWIH13@USECON
• Merchant Whole: Inventories: Professional Equipment NWIH14@USECON
• Merchant Whole: Inventories: Electrical NWIH16@USECON
• Merchant Whole: Inventories: Hardware NWIH17@USECON
• Merchant Whole: Inventories: Machinery NWIH18@USECON
• Merchant Whole: Inventories: Misc. Durable Goods NWIH19@USECON
• Merchant Whole: Inventories: Apparel NWIH23@USECON
Retail Sales measured as (SA, Mil.$):
• Retail Sales: Funiture/Home Furnishings & Elect/Appliance Stores NRSI2T3@USECON
• Retail Sales: Building Materials, Garden Equipment & Supply Dealers NRSI4@USECON
• Retail Sales: Clothing & Accessory Stores NRSI8@USECON
• Retail Sales: General Merchandise Stores NRSJ2@USECON
• Retail Inventories: Total Excl Motor Vehicle & Parts Dealers (EOP) NRIXM@USECON
Figure 7 (Japanese data);
• Japan: Producers Shipments: Mfr (SA, 2005=100) S158TSM@G10;
• Japan: Producers Inventories: Mining & Mfr (SA, 2005=100) S158TI@G10;
• Japan: Export Price Index: All Commodities (SA, 2005=100) F158PFXI@G10;
• Japan: Import Price Index: All Commodities (SA, 2005=100) F158PFMI@G10;
• Japan: Imports of Goods (SA, Bil.Yen) S158IM@G10;
• Japan: Exports of Goods (SA, Bil.Yen) S158IX@G10; Japan:
• Industrial Production: Mining and Mfr (SA, 2005=100) S158DMN@G10;
• Japan: Industrial Production: Mfr (SA, 2005=100) S158DM@G10;
Figure 8
In addition to the Ward’s data on foreign inventory and sales from Figure 3, we used Ward’s
data on US sales and inventory of North American-made autos and data from the Cen-
sus/BEA. Speciﬁcally,
• US: Vehicle Inventory made in North America (NSA, Units) UINA@WARDS
• US: Vehicle Sales made in North America (NSA, Units) USNA@WARDS
• Real Inventories: Retail Trade: Motor Vehicle/Parts Dlrs (EOP, SA, 2005$) TIRI1H@USECON
• Real Inventories: Merch Whole: Motor Vehicles (EOP, SA, 2005$) TIWH11H@USECON
• Real Inventories: Mfg: Motor Vehicles & Parts (EOP, SA, 2005$) TIMG6MH@USECON
• Real Sales: Retail Trade: Motor Vehicle & Parts Dlrs (SA, 2005$) TSRI1H@USECON
We then constructed Imported Autos (BEA/Ward’s) as αt =
Foreign Inventory (Ward’s)t
Retail Inventory (Ward’s)t ,γ t =
Foreign Sales (Ward’s)t




αt ∗ Real Retail Inventory (Census)t + Real Wholesale Inventory (Census)t
γt ∗ Real Sales (Census)t
f ISt =
(1 − αt) ∗ Real Retail Inventory (Census)t + Real Mfg Inventory (Census)t
(1 − γt) ∗ Real Sales (Census)t
44Calibration






1/2(Mfrs Exportst +M f r sI m p o r t s t)
Mfrs Shipmentst
where
• Mfrs’ Shipments: All Mfr Industries (SA, Mil.$) NMS@USECON
• Imports for Consumption: Mfr, Total (Customs Value, Mil.$), TMME0@USECON








P r i v a t eE x p e n d i t u r e so nG o o d s
where
• Inventoryt = Average private business inventory over year t (series tbivu from the
January 2010 Census Manufacturing and Trade Inventories and Sales report)
• Private Expendituret = Personal consumption expenditures on Goods (line 3) + Gross
private domestic investment on Equipment and software (line 11) from BEA NIPA
Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic Product.
45Table A1 : Trade Dynamics Under Alternative Detrending Methods
HP 1600 Li HP 10^5 Rd t
IMPORTS Median 2009Q2 Median 2009Q2 Median 2009Q2 Median 2009Q2
Y 4.67 4.81 4.72 4.72 4.54 4.54 3.19 8.49
IP 1.64 1.66 1.75 1.76 1.70 1.71 1.41 1.54
HP = 1600 Linear HP = 10^5 Raw data
Demand 2.38 1.70 2.28 1.64 2.13 1.73 1.83 1.83
EXPORTS
Y 2.54 4.10 1.74 2.80 1.31 2.87 -0.97 4.28
IP 14 1 14 1 08 9 10 4 07 4 10 8 01 7 07 8 IP 1.41 1.41 0.89 1.04 0.74 1.08 -0.17 0.78
Demand 1.45 1.45 0.97 0.97 0.77 1.09 -0.36 0.92
EXPORTS (peak to trough)
Y 33 3 50 9 28 3 33 3 25 3 31 9 60 8 65 4 Y 3.33 5.09 2.83 3.33 2.53 3.19 6.08 6.54
IP 1.53 1.75 0.97 1.24 0.97 1.20 0.86 1.19
Demand 1.80 1.80 1.19 1.16 1.21 1.21 0.61 1.41
In entor Sales Ratio Inventory-Sales Ratio
IP -0.56 -0.49 -0.47 -0.47 -0.48 -0.42 -0.75 -0.55
Notes: Measured from start of recession based on the NBER dates. The third panel measures the difference in exports between the peak and trough, 
where the peak is either the start of the recession if exports fall immediately. Three seperate detrending methods were used. HP=1600 stands for data 
HP filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600; Linear stands for removing a linear trend; and HP=10^5 stands for HP filtered with a smoothing 
parameter of 10^5. Thus, all drops are measured relative to the trend.  Raw data are the unfiltered data.
             Table A2: Alternative Measures of Trade Volatility
A. Adjusting Trade Weights for Durables and Motor Vehicles (Quarterly)*
SD (rel to IP TW) IP IP TW Exports Imports Autocorr.
Industrial Production 0.91 1.00 0.99 0.58 0.86 0.89
Industrial Production (TW) 10 0 09 9 10 0 05 1 08 9 08 8
A. Adjusting Trade Weights for Durables and Motor Vehicles (Quarterly)
Correlation with 
IndustrialP roduction (TW) 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.51 0.89 0.88
Exports 1.34 0.58 0.51 1.00 0.33 0.85
Imports 1.48 0.86 0.89 0.33 1.00 0.84
B I d t A l i f M t V hi l d P t (M thl 94M1 t 10M1)**
SD (rel to IP) IP Exports Imports Shipments Autocorr.
Industrial Production (IP) 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.85 0.80 0.76
B. Industry Analysis of Motor Vehicles and Parts (Monthly, 94M1 to 10M1)**
Correlation with 
Exports 1.33 0.84 1.00 0.91 0.58 0.84
Imports 1.35 0.85 0.91 1.00 0.63 0.88
Shipments 0.82 0.80 0.58 0.63 1.00 0.68
Notes: * Based on quarterly data from 72Q1 to 09Q4. HP filtered with a smoothingp aramter of 1600. IPTW uses 2003 to 2007 trade 
 ** Based on monthly data from 94M1 to 10M1. HP filtered with a smoothing paramter of 14400. Industrial Production: Motor 
Vehicles and Parts (SA, 2002=100); Exports: Automotive Vehicles, Parts and Engines (SA, Mil.Chn.2005$); Imports: Automotive 
V hi l P t d E i (SA Mil Ch 2005$) R l S l Mf M t V hi l & P t (SA Mil Ch 2005$)
qy QQ g p
weights on Durables excluding motor vehicles, motor vehicles, and nondurables.
Vehicles, Parts, and Engines (SA, Mil.Chn.2005$) Real Sales: Mfg: Motor Vehicles & Parts (SA, Mil.Chn.2005$).Figure A1: Aggregate Dynamics in US Recessions